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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTI-TRUST ACT-CRI MINAL PROSECUTION OF A LABOR UNION
1
were inFOR A CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-Defendants
dicted under Section 3 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 2 for a criminal

conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce within the District of
Columbia. Specifically, they were charged with seeking to replace
members of another union which had collective agreements with the
employers involved with members .of their own organization through
the use of strikes, boycotts, threats, force and violence. A demurrer
was interposed on the grounds that a labor union or its agents are
exempt from the operation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and that,
furthermore, the alleged acts are not illegal. An alternative motion
was also made to quash the indictment for indefiniteness, vagueness
and uncertainty. Held, the indictment is sufficiently clear and definite, and the alleged resort to force and the attempted interference with
existing contracts and collective bargaining rights rendered both the
object of the activity and the means employed for its attainment
unlawful and removed the defendant organization from any limited
exemption that it may have enjoyed as a labor union. United States
v. Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 639 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, et al., 32 F. Supp. 594 (D. C. D. C. 1940).
Combinations of labor as well as of capital have been repeatedly
held by the courts to be included within the provisions of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act of 1890.' Decisions following the promulgation of
the Clayton Act,4 aside from reaffirming that a labor union was not
to be deemed a monopoly ipso facto,5 did not greatly favor labor.6
1 There were six defendants, namely, Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local
Union No. 639 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Stablemen and Helpers of America; Thomas O'Brien, a representative of the
International Brotherhood; and four officers or representatives of the Drivers
Union Local No. 639.
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §3 (1927).
3 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908) ; Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, et al., 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940); United States v.
Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (E. D. La. 1893), aff'd, 57
Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893). Despite an unbroken succession of cases to the
contrary, labor leaders still insist that unions are not, and never were, intended to
be subject to anti-trust prosecution. See letter of William Green to AttorneyGeneral Murphy in N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1939, p. 30, col. 4.; Shernan.Act and
Labor Unions (1939) 5 LAB. REL. Rp. 316.
438 STAT. 730 (1914) (with the addition thereto of the "labor sections").
5 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, et al., 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct.
172 (1921).
6 Section 6 was held not to exempt a union or its members "from accountability where it or they depart from its normal, legitimate objects and engage in
an actual coifibination or conspiracy in restraint of trade", and the attempt in
Section 20 to restrict the' issuance of injunctions was rendered nugatory by a
narrow definition of a "labor dispute". Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
et al., 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921) ; American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921).
See
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The courts still held that labor organizations are subject to the antitrust laws, and that the Clayton Act did not give labor a free rein to
engage in acts which would be unlawful for other combinations to
commit.7 All combinations, whether labor or otherwise, were held
to be accountable for violations of the Act, either as to the means or
the end.' If the end sought to be attained is in violation of the statute,
the means to effect the end are immaterial, 9 for means legal in themselves cannot be used for an illegal end.10 Acts lawful in themselves
assume an unlawful character when they are so interwoven with acts
inherently criminal that the whole plan must be condemned as a
violation of the laws against conspiracy in restraint of trade; 1 1 and
even, if the object of the combination is outside the purview of the
Act, the combination is, nonetheless, unlawful, if the means adopted to
effectuate
the end directly or unduly obstruct the free flow of com2
merce.'
In the instant case, the allegations in the indictment, if proven,
would be sufficient to show that defendants' object was not a legitimate one. The employers involved had existing contracts with an
opposing union requiring them at all times to engage 75% of their
employees from the members of that union. Adherence to the defendants' demands would result not only in an illegal breach of a valid
existing contract1 3 but also in a violation of the National Labor
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) 142; BERMAN,
LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT (1930) 99; WiTTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR

DIsPuTEs (1932) 66.

7 Duplex Printing Press Co. v." Deering, et al., 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct.
172 (1921); International Organization, United Mine Workers of America v.
Carbon Fuel Co., 275 U. S. 536, 48 Sup. Ct. 31 (1927) ; United States v. Railway Employees' Dept., A. F. L., 286 Fed. 228 (N. D. Ill. 1922). Contra: the
contraventioh of public as well as employer interest by labor activity finds some
immunity in the doctrine of damnum absque injuria, the damage being justified
by the purpose. This doctrine was developed by Justice Holmes in his article,

Privilege, Malice and Intent (1894) 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, and in his opinions in
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896) ; Plant v. Woods, 176
Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 (1900) ; Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 25 Sup.
Ct. 3 (1904). See FRANEFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra-note 6, at 24.
8 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, et al., 202 Fed. 512 (D. C. W. Va.
1912), modified and aff'd, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917); United States
v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 800 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
0 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436
(1903) ; H. B. Marinelli, Ltd. v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 Fed.
165 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
10 Lamar v. United States, 260 Fed. 561 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), cert. denied,
250 U. S. 673, 40 Sup. Ct. 16 (1919). "The Statute covers any illegal means
by which interstate commerce is restrained, whether the restraint is occasioned
by unlawful contracts, trusts, *** blacklists, boycotts, coercion, threats, intimidation, and whether these are made effective, in whole or in part, by acts, words
or printed matter"--Gompers v. Buck Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418, 438, 31 Sup. Ct.
492 (1911).
" United States v. Railway Dept., A. F. L., 286 Fed. 228 (N. D. Ill. 1922).
S12San Francisco Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup.
Ct. 403 (1924).
( 3 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 249, 38 Sup. Ct. 65
(1917) ; Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien, 278 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ohio
1922).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 15

Relations Act.14 Even if the object of the defendants were to be held
legitimate and reasonable, 15 the means allegedly employed to achieve
if guilty, are subject to punishit 16 were unlawful, and the defendants,
7
ment under the Sherman Act.'
The Court also ruled against the defendants on their alternative
motion to quash the indictment. An indictment for violation of the
Anti-Trust Act must state all the necessary facts constituting the
offense charged '8 with such definiteness and certainty that the defendant may understand the offense with which he is charged to enable
him to prepare a defense,19 and so that the judgment in the case can
be relied upon in another prosecution for the same offense as a former
acquittal or conviction.20 In the instant case, the 'indictment was
carefully drawn; each defendant is adequately described; the venue
consistently laid in the District of Columbia; and the time is described
as being a continuous period between May 16th, 1939 and the date of
the indictment. The indictment not only charged the alleged crime
in the words of the statute but proceeded to elaborate on the specific
trade and commerce sought to be restrained and the object and purpose of the alleged conspiracy. It named the companies involved.
The Court could not perceive why defendants were. unable to understand and plead to this indictment, especially since more specific
information as to the acts of force, violence and threats could have
been obtained in a bill of particulars. 21
1449 'STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1935) (This act, among its provisions, requires that the employer bargain collectively with the organization representing a majority of the employees. In the instant case, this would be not
the defendants but the opposing A. F. L. Union representing, according to the
contract at least 75% of the employees).
15 See Terrio, et at. v. S. N. Nielson Construction Co., et al., 30 F. Supp.
77 (D. C. La. 1939) (Where the object was similar to instant case, but the
means employed differed greatly).
16 As stated, "the prevention, by threat of force and by the use of actual
force, of delivery of concrete to construction projects by 'mixer' trucks driven
and operated by persons other than members of defendant union * * * and the
threat to call and the actuil calling of strikes so as to stop work on the
projects." Instant case at 596.
17 San Francisco Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 45 Sup.
Ct. 403 (1924); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930),
rev'g, 35 F. (2d) 34 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
Is United States v. Colgate, 253 Fed. 522 (E. D. Va. 1918), aff'd, 250
U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465 (1919) ; United States v. American Naval Stores Cb.,
186 Fed. 592 (S. D. Ga. 1809). It is not sufficient to charge the offense in the
language of the statute because it does not set forth all the elements necessary
to constitute the offense; United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. 605 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1893); Cilley v. U. S. Shoe Machinery Co., 152 Fed. 726 (C. C. Mass.
1907).
19 Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; United
States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 163 Fed. 66 (C. C. Tenn. 1908);
United States v. Calwell, 243 Fed. 730 (D. C. D. Ore. 1917).
20 State v. Witherspoon, 115 Tenn. 138, 90 S. W. 852 (1906).
21 Nash v. United States, 186 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 5th, 1910), re7ld on other
grounds, 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780 (1912) ; United States v. Brookman, 1
F. (2d) 528 (D. C. Minn. 1924); Beard v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 837
(App. D. C. 1936).
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It seems, therefore, that the objections to the use of the criminal
sections of the anti-trust laws against labor unions have no legal basis.
The remedy would be to apply to Congress for legislative changes in
and not to attack it on grounds of invalidity of the
the present law,
22
form of action.
A.A.
BANKRUPTCY-APPOINTMENT

OF

RECEIVER

AS

AN
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oF

AcT.-The
appellant, having been adjudicated a bankrupt, seeks to set aside the
order of adjudication upon the ground that he has not committed any
act of bankruptcy. It was alleged in the involuntary petition that the
appellant and his partner, while engaged in the business of selling
securities to the public, permitted the appointment of a receiver. The
receiver was appointed after an action had been commenced by the
Attorney General in the Supreme Court in New York pursuant to the
provisions of the Martin Act.1 The appellant consented to the appointment. The complaint in that action alleged that the defendants had
intermingled their funds with those of their customers to such an
extent that the assets could not be identified in kind because of such
intermingling. The receiver was appointed to take possession of, administer, and liquidate so much of the defendants' property which
would be found to be acquired by means of such fraudulent practices
in the sale of securities. The appellant in his answer to the involuntary petition contended that this appointment did not constitute an act
of bankruptcy as defined by the Chandler amendments to the Bankruptcy Acts. 2 Held, the appointment of the receiver did not constitute
an act of bankruptcy, proceeding dismissed, order vacated. Elfast v.
Lamb, 111 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
The appointment of a receiver in an action pursuant to the provisions of the Martin Act 3 does not constitute an act of bankruptcy.
It is expressly stipulated in General Business Law, Section 353a,
among other things, that the judgment entered in an action pursuant
to the provisions of the aforementioned Act may provide that the
powers of the receiver are limited only to those assets which were
derived by means of fraudulent acts. This is exactly what had
occurred in this case. The order of appointment provided that the
receiver is directed to "take possession and title of the property and
22 See letter of Assistant Attorney-General Thurman Arnold to the Secretary of the Central Labor Union of Indianapolis, N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1939,
p. 1, col. 4, stating the liberal policy which will be pursued in respect to prosecution of labor unions under the Anti-trust Act.
IN. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 353, 353a.
252 STAT. 844, 11 U. S. C. A. §21a(5) (1938): "Acts of bankruptcy by a
person shall consist of his having * ** (5) while insolvent or unable to pay his
debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property."
3 See note 1, supra.
BANKRUPTCY-LIMITED RECEIVERSHIP UNDER MARTIN

